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Abstract
The traditional literature on the CAPM assumes that investor’s tax payments simply vanish from the
model. This assumption is not at all consistent with the actual behavior of the Treasury. The theory
of general equilibrium states that an interest rate rf = 0 will not affect prices if taxes are introduced.
We show that this result can be extended to the CAPM if the tax payments are redistributed among
investors.
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1 Presentation of the Problem
The standard CAPM is a neoclassical equilibrium
model basedon some simplifying assumptions (see
Sharpe 1964, Lintner 1965, and Mossin 1966). In
particular, it relies on the assumption that in-
vestors base their decisions on the expected value
and variance of cash flows with no taxes being
collected.
Brennan (1970) was the first to model taxes within
aCAPM.Hisworkwas the foundation of numerous
further contributions. Whereas Brennan analyzed
a proportional tax, Litzenberger and Ramaswamy
(1979) and Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1980)
looked at a progressive tax. As early as in the 1990s
Koenig (1990) applied Brennan’s model to the tax
system that was valid in Germany at that time.
More recent analyses taking current German tax
regulations into account have been provided by
Wiese (2004), Jonas, Loeffler, and Wiese (2004),
Wiese (2006a),Wiese (2006b),RappandSchwetz-
ler (2007) and Wiese (2007).
It should be emphasized that all thesemodels were
single period models in which the investors base
their decisions on the μ-σ criterion while assuming
risk aversion. When taking a closer look at how
taxes are modeled, a circumstance emerges that so
far has gone unnoticed. At the end of the period
the Treasury collects taxes which are not returned
to the taxpayers. For a drastic illustration of this
model’s peculiarity let us imagine that investors
live on an island which once a year is ravaged by
pirates who relieve them of taxes, which they will
never see again.
This circumstance is hardly compatible with an
equilibrium model. Rather, it would appear more
appropriate to assume that the tax authorities re-
invest their revenue in the form of transfer pay-
ments. These include unemployment insurance,
pension funds, compulsory health insurance, de-
velopment aid etc.
In a recent paper Eikseth and Lindset (2009) con-
sider the redistribution of taxes. Surprisingly, they
do not report on any effects on the equilibrium se-
curity prices. Authors dealing with scientific topics
of public finance have also made such assump-
tions (see, e.g., Konrad 1991 p. 167, Buchholz and
Konrad 2000 p. 87). or at least point out that the
model analysis responds very sensitively depend-
ing on which redistribution system is assumed
(see, e.g., Stiglitz 1972 or Rapp and Schwetzler
2008). Konrad analyzes a model where the dif-
ference between cash flows and opportunity costs
is taxed, whereas in our model cash flow minus
depreciation forms the tax base. Konrad de facto
looks at a Johansson-Samuelson tax. Seen in this
light, our model is closer to the existing national
tax codes. Rapp and Schwetzler look at a binomial
model where at t = 1 exactly two states are pos-
sible. In this model investors trade on two stock
markets that are not connected to each other. The
redistribution is given by a random variable. It
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turns out that the specific form of redistribution
has an important impact on the asset’s prices. In
our model the uncertainty is much more general
since we allow for multiple states of nature.
If one then takes into account that the revenue of
the tax authorities is allocated to investors accord-
ing to a specific rule, then this will impact on the
optimal portfolio and hence on equilibrium prices.
We must assume that the tax CAPM equations
derived by Brennan and others are questionable,
at least to the extent that they are based on the
unrealistic assumption that the tax revenue van-
ishes. In the next two sections we wish to show
that the equilibrium prices in the CAPM remain
unchanged, provided one of the following two re-
quirements is met:
• The risk-free interest rate vanishes.
• Investors have μ-σ utility functions with con-
stant absolute risk aversion.
We are able to provide convincing intuitions for
both conclusions.
2 The Model
The CAPM is a two-period model, represented by
today (time 0) and tomorrow (time 1). The future
is uncertain. We examine I investors i = 1, . . . , I
who trade on a capital market and have individual
μ-σ utility functions
(1) Ui(μ,σ2)
depending on expectation and variance of securi-
ties’ payments. Utility functions like this can be ex-
plained through independent axioms for the pref-
erences (see Loeffler 1996b). These utility func-
tions are strictly monotonically increasing in the
first variable (expected value μ) and strictly mono-
tonically decreasing in the second variable (vari-
ance σ2). Moreover, they are quasi-concave, which
means that the answers of the individual maxi-
mization problems are always unique.
There are n = 0, . . . ,N assets with cash flows of Y˜n
at a specific time t = 1. These cash flows consist
both of dividends and capital gains. The 0-th asset
is the risk-free asset and pays a unit in the next
period; all other assets are uncertain. Portfolio X
consists of these N + 1 assets, whereby the n-th
entry Xn designates the number of the n-th asset
which an investor holds at a specific time t = 0. The





The amount of the optimal risk-free asset isXi
0
. Ac-
cordingly, Xi designates the (optimal) risky port-
folio of investor i, whereby this portfolio is a N-
dimensional vector with entries Xi
1
to XiN .
The vector E includes theN expected values of the
payments of the risky assets. The corresponding
covariance matrix is Ωwith the dimensionsN ×N .





+ Xi · E. The variance is (Xi)T · Ω · Xi.
The investors’ initial endowment (X¯i
0
, X¯i) consists
of the risky asset and a share of the riskless asset.
For every risky share there is one unit in total; the







X¯in = 1 (n > 0).
We designate the sum of the risky initial endow-
ments as the market portfolioM.
Theprice of aportfolioX is describedby the symbol
p(X). Hence the budget restriction of an investor
reads as follows: p(Xi
0
) + p(Xi) = p(X¯i
0
) + p(X¯i).
There is no arbitrage in the equilibrium. Therefore,
theprices are linear. Consequently, there is a vector
p which implies that
(4) ∀X p(X) = p · X.
Vectorp isnotnecessarilypositiveaswearedealing
with prices of the basic assets rather than state
prices.
We assume that the tax authorities collect a tax
on the investors’ income. The valuation basis is
the difference resulting from the return flows of
the optimal portfolio and the capital endowment.
Risky and riskless entries are subject to the same
linear tax rate τ. Therefore, the i-th investor’ tax
debts amount to






















As opposed to Brennan (1970) in our model divi-
dends, capital gains and interest are taxed differ-
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ently.Whether our resultswill survivewith a richer
tax system remains to be seen.
The total tax revenues
∑I
i=1 T
i are redistributed to
the investors according to a certain rule. The i-th
investor receives the share ωi of the entire revenue





applies. Evidently the sharesωi are then determin-
istic. If the distribution parameters are accepted
as random variables, then any equilibrium could
be explained. We know that a certain total amount
can be distributed to the investors. If we then wish
to attain a special income distribution, we select
theωi in precisely such a way that in each environ-
mental condition and depending on the payment
of the initial endowment, the required financial
means can be either allocated to the investors
or taken away. This counteracts the distribution
mechanism, however.
An equilibrium is characterized by two conditions:
Each investor maximizes their individual utility
and the markets are cleared. In our model there is
another problemwhichwewish to point out: Based
on our assumptions the activity of one investor
has, due to the tax returns, an impact on the
optimization problem of all other investors.
It would, therefore, be conceivable that investors
take the initiative and form coalitions which might
initially lead to fictitious equilibria that could at-
tain stability only on the basis of these tax re-
turns. Such equilibria are discussed in the liter-
ature as ‘‘sunspot equilibrium’’ (see, for instance
Shell (forthcoming)). We wish to rule out such
equilibria and therefore assume that -- provided
the investor has the profit of his utility -- he will
take a decision that is optimal for the other in-
vestors, hence avoiding sunspot equilibria.
Definition 2.1 An equilibrium is described by
a price vector p and a demand quantity
(Xi
0




,Xi) maximizes the utility for in-
vestor i, provided the allocation of all other
investors is optimal (see equation (13)).
2. Total demand corresponds to the complete
initial endowment of all investors (market
clearance).
Due to the law of Walras it is sufficient under
market clearance to take into account only the
risky assets. If an equilibrium exists there, then an
equilibrium also exists for riskless assets.
Let us now take a glance at the individual util-
ity maximization problem. We know the expected
value and the variance in the assets’ cash flows.

















































The argument of the variance function can be sim-
plified because the risk-free asset and the price of
the portfolio are irrelevant. Taking into account
that the return flow of the riskless asset has been
normalized to the value 1 and based on equation
(4), the budget constraint of the i-th market par-





= p(X¯i0) + p(X¯
i) − p · Xi .
We can simplify the problem since we know the
expected value and the covariance matrix. If we










must apply for the equilibrium, the optimization














i · E − p(X¯i))
)
+
+ωiτ(E − p) · 1 ,(
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Finally we will proceed to solve the side condition
(8) for Xi
0
and plug it into the function to be





(1 + rf )
(
p(X¯i0) + p(X¯
i) − Xi · p
)
+
+ Xi · E − τ
[
(1 + rf )
(
p(X¯i0) + p(X¯




i · E − p(X¯i)
]
+ ωiτ(E − p) · 1,(




(1 − τ)Xi + ωiτ
))
.
The first-order conditions read as follows:
(12) Uiμ
(
E − (1 + rf ) · p − τ
(
E − (1 + rf ) · p
))
+
+ 2(1 − τ)Uiσ2Ω ·
(
(1 − τ)Xi + ωiτ
)
= 0 .
After cancellations of 1 − τ the result will be
(13) Uiμ
(
E − (1 + rf ) · p
)
+
+ 2Uiσ2 Ω ·
(
(1 − τ)Xi + ωiτ
)
= 0 ,
whereby the arguments of the utility functions
(expected value and variance) are provided by
(14) μ(X) = (1 + rf )
(
p(X¯i0) + p(X¯





(1 + rf )
(
p(X¯i0) + p(X¯
i) − Xi · p
)
−p(X¯i0) + X
i · E − p(X¯i)
]









(1 − τ)Xi + ωiτ
)
.
Equation (13) is the starting point for our next
considerations.
2.1 Vanishing Risk-free Rate
Proposition 2.1 (vanishing risk-free inter-
est rate) The risk-free interest rate is zero.
We look at an equilibrium p and (Xi
0
,Xi)i=1...,I
at the tax rate of τ > 0. We then deal with an
allocation (Zi
0
,Zi)i=1,...,I from (20) whereby p and
this allocation also constitute an equilibrium at a
tax rate of τ = 0.
Please note that we do not show the uniqueness
of equilibrium prices. Statements on uniqueness
in the CAPM can be found in Hens, Laitenberger,
and Loeffler (2002). Bottazzi, Hens, and Loeffler
(1998) show that the CAPM typically possesses
many equilibria. Hence it is possible that various
equilibriawith different prices can exist at tax rates
of τ > 0 or even τ = 0. We will show that at least
one of the possible equilibria must have the price
vector p.
The result of the theorem is intuitive. A risk-
less interest rate of zero is effectively equivalent
to interest-corrected profit taxation (see Wenger
1983). For a considerable time it has been known
that this tax is investment-neutral and therefore
has no influence on the prices of goods in the
equilibrium. Thus this result does not come as a
surprise, and it is independent of the particular
redistribution system.
Proof:
We take the first-order conditions according to (13)
and set the interest rate to zero. As a result we have




(1 − τ)Xi + ωiτ
)
= 0 ,
and the utility function arguments are simplified
to




(1 − τ)Xi + ωiτ
)T
· (E − p),
σ2(X) =
(





(1 − τ)Xi + ωiτ
)
.
On the basis of this maximization condition it
becomes evident that every equilibrium with a tax
rate τ > 0 has a corresponding equilibrium with
the tax rate τ = 0 possessing the same prices for
risky assets.We assume that the allocation (Xi
0
,Xi)
and the price vector p describe an equilibrium for
τ > 0. Moreover, if we define




i) − Zi · p
we can show that this allocation leads to an equilib-
rium when the price vector p remains unchanged,
provided τ = 0. In particular we must verify the
following:
1. The aggregate demand is identical to the ag-
gregate supply (market clearance).
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2. Investor i is able to acquire theportfolio (Zi
0
,Zi)
with an optimal utility for themselves.
Based on the law of Walras we can restrict our
considerations to the market for risky assets. All
markets for risky financial assets are cleared be-
cause we assume






((1 − τ)Xin + ω
iτ) = 1.
It is obvious that investor i abides by their budget
constraint. We therefore only need to verify that
this portfolio maximizes their individual utility.
For this purpose we assume that portfolio Xi is
optimal. It then fulfills the first-order condition
at τ > 0 according to equation (16). To validate
whether portfolio Zi is optimal -- in the event that
the tax rate vanishes -- we let this portfolio take the
place of Xi in the equation (16) and also employ
τ = 0. As a result we receive
(21) Uiμ (E − p) + 2U
i
σ2 Ω · (Z
i) = 0
with the new arguments















This equation is in fact fulfilled for Zi = (1− τ)Xi +
ωiτ by means of construction. This is what we
intended to show.
Konrad (1991) found a neutrality result that seems
comparable toour theorem. In fact his result differs
in an important aspect from our model. Konrad
allows opportunity costs to be deducted from the
tax base. This is a tax first advocated by Johansson
and Samuelson (taxation of economic gain). Our
model is much closer to the tax systems currently
in place in most countries.
2.2 CARA Utility Functions
The literature typically discusses the concept of
absolute risk aversion within the scope of the ex-
pected utility theory. However, it can also be de-
fined within μ-σ utility functions. For this purpose





The function features constant absolute risk aver-
sion when the quotient Si is not dependent on
the expected value μ, but rather dependent on the
variance σ2 (see proposition 3 in Lajeri-Chaherli
and Nielsen 1993 or property 5 in Meyer 1987).
Proposition 2.2 (CARA utility function) The
investors have functions with constant absolute
risk aversion. Moreover, p and (Xi
0
,Xi)i=1...,I con-
stitute an equilibrium for the tax rate τ > 0. Then
we have an allocation (Zi
0
,Zi)i=1,...,I as in (29) in
such a way that p and this allocation constitute
an equilibrium for the tax rate τ = 0.
This result, too, is easily explained intuitively. In
the case of constant absolute risk aversion the
optimal supply of risky assets remains constant
when the investor’s income is subject to changes
(no income effects). Hence the income tax has no
influenceon the riskyportionof theoptimal portfo-
lio, since the risky assets are taxed proportionally
and the redistribution affects the endowment of
the risk-free assets. If, however, the optimal risky
assets are identical to a situation without taxes,
we conclude from the law of Walras that also the
optimal risk-free assets must be in an equilibrium.
Proof:
Due to rf > 0 we now have p0 < 1. The adequate












(1 − τ)Xi + ωiτ
)
= 0 .
After aggregation through all investors and by tak-











= 2 Ω · 1.
At a constant risk aversion quotients are only de-
pendent on the variance
(27)
(




(1 − τ)Xi + ωiτ
)
.
To prove that the tax rate has no influence on the
prices of risky assets, we will -- under Walras’ law
-- concentrate on the risky assets and assume that
the allocation (Xi)i=1,...,I and the price vector p con-
stitute an equilibrium. Then for these allocations
and a tax rate of τ > 0 the first-order conditions
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in compliance with (25) have been met for every












(1 − τ)Xi + ωiτ
)
.
Now we deal with the case without taxes. Let the
equilibrated allocation be designated as (Zi)i=1,...,I .
The first-order condition must be fulfilled for this
allocation as well and this time τ = 0 applies.
However, the tax rate only appears in the argument
of the condition. We now select
(29) Zi := (1 − τ)Xi + ωiτ,
and as a result equation (25) applies trivially. The
budget constraints are met, because the risk-free
asset is selected precisely in such a way that one
can purchase the risk-free portfolio. The market







(1 − τ)Xi + ωiτ = 1.
We have thus attained an equilibrium at the price
p.
At the beginning of this section we referred to the
concept of absolute risk aversion (CARA) that is
typically used with expected utility. The literature
on CARA is manifold (see, e.g., Meyer 1987). Char-
acteristics of relative risk aversion within expected
utility are discussed, e.g., in Katz (1983), Briys and
Eeckhoudt (1985), and Hey (1985). The case of
relative risk aversion is also intensely discussed.
Going back to Mehra and Prescott (1985) it is
usually stated that constant relative risk aversion
(CRRA) is a reasonable assumption. Sinn (1989,
p. 162) has concluded, that CRRA are the only util-
ity functions that are compatible with empirical
results of psychological experiments. Therefore,
one could justifiably ask why we do not apply
CRRA-functions here. The answer is simply that
within the μ-σ2 calculus there are no functions
with a constant relative risk aversion (for a proof
see Loeffler 1996a p. 32 f.).
2.3 Two Further Examples
Ifwewant to generate the result according towhich
prices are dependent on the tax rate, then the risk-
free interest rate may not vanish and there may be
no CARA utility functions.
For such an example we examine just one sin-
gle risky asset and two investors. One of the two
decision-makers owns a risky asset; the other owns
nothing. The matrix Ω degenerates to the variance
of the risky asset; for simplicity the matrix is set
to 1. As a consequence E and p are numbers.






It is strictly quasi-concave and thus satisfies the
requirements needed for a unique solution of the
maximization calculation. Starting from (13) the
FOC for every investor is as follows:
(32) 0 =









Simplifying and inserting the arguments for μ and
σ (considering that the initial endowment of risk-
free asset is zero) leads us to
(33)
(









(1 − τ)Xi + ωiτ
) [
(1 + rf (1 − τ))p(X¯
i) +




We substitute Zi := (1 − τ)Xi + ωiτ and formulate
the equation as follows:
(34) 0 = (Zi)2 + 2Zi
(
1 + rf (1 − τ)




E − (1 + rf )p
)
− 1 .
This is a quadratic equation with the unknown Zi
which can be solved. The solution is dependent on
the initial endowment. One of the investors owns a
share (i.e. p(X¯i) = p), the other owns nothing (i.e.
p(X¯i) = 0).
Investor with one share as initial endow-
ment
The solution of the equation reads
(35) Z1 = −
1 + rf (1 − τ) + τrf ω1




1 + rf (1 − τ) + ω1τrf
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Investor without a share as initial endow-
ment
The solution of the equation reads
(36) Z2 = −
1 + rf (1 − τ) + pτrf ω2




1 + rf (1 − τ) + pτrf ω2
E − (1 + rf )p
)2
+ 1.
As a consequence of the market clearance and
ω1+ω2 = 1 andafter the additionof bothportfolios
and some rearrangement, the following results:
(37) E + 1 + rf (1 − τ) =
= ±
√(
(1 + rf (1 − τ) + ω1τrf )p
)2
+ (E − (1 + rf )p)2
±
√(
1 + rf (1 − τ) + pτrf ω2
)2
+ (E − (1 + rf )p)2 .
For the event of a uniform distribution of tax
revenue ωi = 1
2
we have determined a numerical
solution, as shown in the table below. The other
parameters are rf = 5%, E = 2. Although two
solutions result, one of them leads straight to a
return of 5% for the risky assets and is therefore
economically meaningless. It is evident that the
price is contingent on the tax rate. In our model all
Table 1: Contingency of equilibrium price p












investors had the same tax rate. This assumption is
of particular importance for our results. It is easy
to demonstrate that with a heterogenous taxation
prices will depend on the tax rate. To this end we
assume that there is only one risky asset. Ω, p, and
E degenerate to real numbers. Furthermore, we
assume that investor 1 bears no tax (τ1 = 0) and
investor 2 is fully taxed (τ2 = τ). Both investors




(38) 0 = E − (1 + rf )p + ΩX1
for the first investor and
(39) 0 = E − (1 + rf )p + Ω
(
(1 − τ)X2 + ω2τ
)
for the second one. Additionally,X1+X2 = 1must
hold in equilibrium. From these three equations
(40)





can be concluded by some simple rearrangement.
Obviously, the price depends on the tax rate.
3 Conclusion
Authors contributing to the tax CAPM discussion
usually neglect the fact that the Treasury typically
redistributes the tax revenues that were collected
from investors. Whereas this may be acceptable
for a partial model, it is certainly unacceptable for
a total model. Surprisingly, this aspect has been
overlooked by a large number of authors. Based
on a total model that contained the redistribu-
tion we can show that equilibrium security prices
are not affected by taxation, if either the riskless
rate vanishes or investors show constant absolute
risk aversion. Both results can be explained by
economic reasoning. However, neither vanishing
interest rates nor CARA utility functions are re-
alistic cases. Since there seems to be no way to
extend our results beyond those two special cases,
we conclude as a rule that taxes do have an impact
on security prices in the CAPM as a rule. Further
research should try to reveal whether this impact
is substantial or negligible.
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